

Why We Fight: A Brief Comment on Certain Elements of Psychoanalytic Knowledge and Culture

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Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity.

- Horace Mann, architect of public education in America, and first president of Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio

Once Upon a Digressive Preamble – Or, This is How the End Begins

In 2006, a documentary, *Why We Fight* arrived in movie theatres. The title derived from a series of propaganda films made by the director Frank Capra (he of *It's a Wonderful Life* fame) during World War II to help build and sustain a supportive attitude toward the War effort amongst the populace. The 2006 documentary examined the rise and proliferation of the military-industrial complex in the United States. I had, of course, known that it was, oddly enough, a moderate Republican politician [read: liberal Democrat in the current political milieu in the United States] who had coined this famous term. It was very riveting to watch and listen to the excerpts of this measured, advisory speech – and warning – that has, perhaps, not been so familiar. I should like to quote at some length from Dwight D Eisenhower's 1961 *Farewell Address to the Nation* [American Rhetoric: Top One Hundred Speeches, p 1-6]. [I am also acutely aware of and a little uncomfortable with the irony of someone of my political persuasion quoting at length from a president such as Eisenhower – as well as the fact that this is situated in my *Farewell Address* to the IFPE nation as President. You may rest assured that I make no claim to the political mantle of Eisenhower.]

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.....

.... [T]he free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present, and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society. [pp 3-4]

How prescient are Eisenhower's words. Today, in October 2007, nearly forty-seven years later, we find American culture to be thoroughly militarized; and the political economy to be largely colonized by unfettered corporatist-industrial claims on the society and the citizenry. Intellectual curiosity and critical thinking within our educational institutions are not readily in evidence -- in the quality of students' scholarly works; or, given the crushing complex of demands imposed upon faculties, seen in the work of the ostensible transmitters of [for purposes of this address] professional knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values. Indeed, what is perhaps more interesting about Eisenhower's speech is his attention to the broader elements of American culture, and the

deforming effect of such an omnipresent militarized-industrialized shadow culture. We note this with reference not only to the more glaring ‘erosion of liberty’ in our democratic institutions, but to the corrosion of intellectual freedoms and curiosity; the rise of a technocratic elite owing fealty to the State – and the imperilment of academic freedoms – including a skewing of scientific endeavour, touching upon the very nature of the research which is funded and the ontological truths which are ordered and sustained. Challenges to the rhetorically unquestioned mythos of science and scientific enquiry as ‘neutral’ in value and objective in aim are increasingly the norm as we can no longer be assured of such claims. All of this and more have we witnessed, as political ideology is positioned as master to the pursuit of knowledge and the received wisdom of ‘evidence’.

Amongst other recent, politically-driven efforts to assail the academy, under the guise of accountability, is the so-called Spellings Commission, named for the current US Secretary of Education in the Bush-Cheney Administration, Margaret Spellings. The report is entitled *A Test of Leadership: Charting the Future of US Higher Education*, which arrived in 2006. In this report, the Commission recommends that post-secondary educational institutions, such as colleges and universities, develop a national data-base of students, tracking their progress, and linking them [and others?, one has to ask] to their academic records – in the language of the report, ‘allowing meaningful inter-state comparison of student learning’. Assessments are to include assessments of ‘adult literacy, licensure, graduate and professional school exams, and specially administered tests of general intellectual skills’. This is ostensibly for the purpose of permitting state officials to make ‘*valid inter-state comparisons of student learning* and identify short-comings as well as [and here comes another oft-spoken term *du jour* – dld] *best practices*’– [emphasis added; p 23].

Other ominous recommendations include the call [now, actually a requirement at my own university for all under-graduate programs] for institutions to *measure and report* ‘meaningful’ learning

objectives, and, especially, *outcomes*. Such measures are termed ‘evidence-based’ [p 23]. University officials, while tasking their faculties to arrive at ‘meaningful’ ‘outcomes-focussed accountability systems’ [p 23], never-the-less have been served notice that they must develop them, or else have them developed and delivered to them for mandatory usage. Amongst instruments currently available and recommended for by the Spellings Commission are the *Collegiate Learning Assessment* and the *Measure of Academic Proficiency and Progress* [p 23]. In quantifying the results of a collegiate degree, the faculty is also being served notice that their own pedagogical effectiveness is being *measured and reported*.

Friday, 12 October 2007 witnessed the swearing in of Harvard University’s first female president, Dr Drew Gilpin Faust, who, in her inaugural remarks, served notice that she is not necessarily wont to make a Faustian bargain regarding pedagogy and epistemology with the present administration in Washington, DC. Dr Faust, a Civil War historian, focussed many of her remarks toward these trends: ‘A university is not about results in the next quarter. It is not even about who a student has become by graduation. It is aboutlearning that transmits the heritage of millennia; learning that shapes the future’ [*New York Times*, p A12]. She also took the Spelling Commission’s report to task for enjoining universities to train a competitive workforce for the global economy – in other words, worker-consumers for the capitalist elites. According to the *New York Times*, Dr Faust ‘offered a ringing defense of the traditional role of universities as “stewards of living tradition”; as places for “philosophers as well as scientists”, where learning and knowledge are pursued in part “because they define what has over centuries made us human, not because they can enhance our global competitiveness”’ [*Ibid*, p A12].

As discouraging and perhaps shocking as these developments may seem, at the graduate, doctoral-level in clinical psychology, such onerous requirements have, of course, been in place for

many years. However, experience with the American Psychological Association Committee on Accreditation [CoA] has become much more about demonstrating, in the *Self-Study* for accreditation and associated Site Visit [assuming one's program is privileged to receive one] that one has measured, quantitatively, a prescribed series of competencies valorised as requisite for independent professional practice in relation to an associated litany of pre-determined outcomes. Add to this, even more burdensome requirements for the reporting of quantifiable outcomes as mandated by the Spelling Commission, and the ostensible mission of transmitting an abiding appreciation for the theoretical and clinical calling into which the professionals of tomorrow are to be initiated is soon distorted almost beyond recognition. This noble under-taking has been taken to the undertaker to be interred as not only quaintly *passé* but unethical and dangerous as to do otherwise is unsupported by the research on so-called clinical best-practices – that is, as sponsored by cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy research. Thus, we now are enjoined to construct the doctoral-level mental health *technician* as through a series of prescribed technique-anchored robotics and mimicries into an *in loco parentis* agent of the State for the sanctioning of proper thought and behaviour as befitting a citizen worthy of inclusion in some prescribed societal sub-stratum where their labor and station are useful.

In the APA *Self-Study* submitted to the CoA as part of the APA-accreditation process there is scant interest in and hence no space allotted for delineating an abiding theoretical and philosophical position as we would commonly view this. This is pre-determined by the Orwellian Newspeak of an educational discourse commodified by the nomenclature of the corporate board room and the health care-industrial complex. Programs whose identities rest upon sound philosophical moorings, and wish to: [a] note this; and [b] be appreciated for this, are quite unable to do so. Programs whose identities rest upon sound philosophical moorings that find themselves at variance with this prevailing demand will find themselves at peril of losing accreditation or not being accredited at all if

they should push the envelope of the established parameters – and phraseology. Programs that have defined themselves as principally psychoanalytical or humanistic-existential-phenomenological-hermeneutical have experienced negative consequences for their heretical adherence to non-empirically-supported tendencies.

As if this were not onerous enough – the demolition of a program’s unique, aspirational ethos into the lexicon of a market report or accountancy balance sheet – the host organisation of all professional schools of psychology, the National Council of Schools and Programs of Professional Psychology [NCSPP], in its most recent Mid-Winter Conference [January 2007], held attendees hostage to the task of refining the behavioural constituent parts of a set of competencies and outcomes long under development that are to be codified and thus bracket the professional-in-training and the profession itself to contrived standards by which a doctoral program in clinical psychology within the NSCPP or Vail Model can be evaluated [a scholar-practitioner model, as opposed to the scientist-practitioner Boulder Model – there *is* a difference, actually]. The competencies valorised by NCSPP are: (1) Relationship; (2) Assessment; (3) Intervention; (4) Diversity; (5) Research and Evaluation; (6) Management and Supervision; and (7) Consultation and Education. Student progress in the internalisation and mastery of these competencies has now been delineated across pre-practica, practica, internship, and ultimately graduation. These are now touted as ‘Developmental Achievement Levels’, or, like so much rendered in military-ese these days, ‘DALs’ [NCSPP, 2007].

What was striking, even while not entirely unexpected, was the lack of debate regarding what NCSPP was perpetrating/perpetuating. As the designated spokesperson for one of the working groups that I was mandated to assist, I used the opportunity to, in part, inveigh against further contributing to the demise of our profession by privileging an industrialised rubric, philosophy,

orientation, and lexicon to the often ineffable psychotherapeutic enterprise – that formerly was termed an ‘art’, but now is termed, if not a science, essentially *a technique* that is anchored in the ‘research literature’ available in one’s ‘tool-box’ [as it is actually called!] of ‘empirically-based practices’. A *scientized* visioning of the profession is what is sought even if what it renders is utterly *sanitized* – that is, devoid of substance of the very subject it ostensibly offers to elucidate. What cannot be effectively rendered in the visual equivalent of the audio- sound-bite of a Power-point-driven lecture cannot be worth much consideration at all.

And, as I did not have Power-point at my disposal, and was chewing up precious minutes of air time, it was clear that the conference organisers were rather interested in hastening *my* demise, but I did receive some muted acknowledgements from others that they shared my concerns – most belatedly, and away from the other conferees. So: why then, the silence? Why should it be that only this larcenous *moment* rather literally stolen within the show-and-tell programmed confessional of the conference agenda pass without comment then-and-there? Why was – and is – there no debate what so ever on such astonishingly important matters? This became all the more obvious when, at the NCSPP summer meeting in August 2007, prior to the American Psychological Association Convention, I was the only delegate to vote against ratifying the DALs [there are 63 member programs – *ie* APA-accredited; and 17 associate programs. Most programs send at least one delegate to the Mid-Winter Meeting in January, although usually more are in attendance; with a lighter turn-out in August].

Indeed, so rampant is the self-possessed rush to demark and delimit what constitutes ‘competence’ [and, by implication, the opposite], that a certain evangelical arrogance seems to have funded the entire endeavour. Rhetoric of grand aspirational sentiments and proclamations regarding protection of the public [amongst other nostrums] aside, one cannot help but consider this self-

righteous ‘movement’ as an effort at securing for psychology an even more solid footing with respect to the insurance industry that, in effect, underwrites the living wages of psychologist-technicians in the present corporatist milieu. In this rush to legitimize this latest ‘mission’, we witness the dutifully-produced position papers that propose modifications to curricula, pedagogy, epistemic and ontological discourses, and assessment practices for quantification of *outcomes*.

Indeed, an entire volume of the American Psychological Association-sponsored journal, *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice* (October 2007) is devoted to this *cause celebre*. In articulating ‘Guiding principles for the assessment of competence developed by the members of the American Psychological Association’s *Task Force on Assessment of Competence in Professional Psychology*’, Kaslow, *et al* (2007) note that ‘[t]hese principles are applicable to the education, training, and credentialing of professional psychologists, and to practicing psychologists *across the life-span*. The principles are built upon a review of competency assessment models, including practices in both psychology and other professions. These principles will help to ensure that psychologists *reinforce the importance of a culture of competence* [p441, emphases added]. Other papers proceed to delineate how assessment can proceed from definition, all behaviourally-anchored of course; and even the lexicon must shift in accommodating the new order. As one can determine, only certain defining characteristics of so-called competence are proffered; and these hold for every professional psychologist-in-training [and, ‘training’ it is], as well as every practicing psychologist ‘across the life-span’ [*Ibid*, p441]. Once encoded, naturally, sanctions will be developed for failure to adhere to and comply with these dictates.

‘Now’, you may ask, ‘this is all fine and good for career academics, and psychologist career academics at that, but what has all of this to do with psychoanalysis? Here we are, paying hard-earned money, trying to enjoy ourselves with the immersion into the arcana of theory, the heady

aroma of a philosophical discourse on the nature of psychoanalytical knowledge – the stuff of epistemology; nay, even ontological musings with which to truly engage our curiosity and attention and with which we were enticed to attend. What is all of this stuff and nonsense about post-secondary education and clinical psychology? Why sully this important psychoanalytical convocation, with tidings from the outside world? *This* is a presidential address from a *psychoanalyst to psychoanalysts?*

Humor me for an additional nano-second here.

The psychoanalytic institute from which I graduated, and have now worked with a colleague to restore to formal operations mode [my apologies to Piaget!] is chartered by the Illinois Board of Higher Education. It grants the certificate in Psychoanalysis and the Doctorate of Psychoanalysis under authorisation from the State. Transcripts are maintained, as well as other student records. It is, in fact, an institution of higher education, and I am assuming that, sooner or later, what is good for the run-of-the-mill college, and for the APA-accredited doctoral program, will become mandatory for the free-standing psychoanalytic institute. In a word, we have the machinery already in place for ‘No Psychoanalyst Left Behind’. Add to this the emergent trend in licensing psychoanalysis as a health-care profession; and psychoanalysts as its practitioners, and my seeming digressions potentially assume a more center stage position, worthy of [y]our attention. Moreover, the psychoanalytical candidate will have matriculated through a university or college wherein the notion of a liberal arts education has been mutated beyond recognition into that of a vocational-technical school. Further still, they will have then entered the technocratic factory of graduate school to receive and mimic a complex of pre-thought givens pre-determined to constitute a professional identity and competence to practice – indeed, the very mode of clinical practice.

Now the big assumption is that such individuals will even present at the doors of a free-standing institute of psychoanalytic education with the desire to become one of ‘Them’. Assuming that they do, and mindful of the trends that are becoming legally codified, psychoanalysts engaged in any pedagogical activity, including supervision, need to be asking themselves the following: ‘What are the *competencies* you are *training* your middle-aged [for the most] students [already licensed by their host professions] to master? What are the *outcomes* that have been determined to be requisite for entry-level practice [and beyond], and how are these *quantifiable* and therefore independently verified by external audit?’ Eisenhower’s ‘military-industrial complex’ has crept on little hob-nail boots into the consulting rooms of all manner of health-care professionals; forced ajar the doors of the confidential spaces of psychoanalytical and psychotherapeutic relationships, such that we now can claim to have a ‘military-industrial-health-care complex’. ‘Do not disturb’ on the door will not suffice to halt intrusions by the State or the third-party payor/managed care functionary.

Things just get ‘curioser and curioser’ as Alice lamented. Now, I shall let you in on a none-too-subtle secret: ‘Why we fight’ is a bit of a *double entendre*. I have given a very lengthy prelude [and more] as to the dangers afoot in the culture-at-large, including, or especially it would often appear, within our professional ranks of fellow psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, nurses, licensed professional counsellors, and so forth for whom psychoanalysis is a thing to be gotten rid of. Yet, this does not touch upon the question of the internecine strife and warfare waged by psychoanalysts against one another and psychoanalysis against itself – what Bollas might term ‘the violence of the everyday’; or ‘ordinary destructiveness’ [Christopher Bollas Seminars, Chicago, 2006-2007]. These I shall now take up in turn.

The View of Psychoanalysis From the Outside-In: Don't Hate Me Because I'm Beautiful

America is an evil land. Long before the Indians. Long before the Settlers. The evil is there. Waiting.

- *William S Burroughs, Naked Lunch*

Americans are in thrall of quantification. Reducing the ineffable to a numeric that stands in place of that which it ostensibly represents as a process of substitution by reification is privileged above the more difficult pathway of drawing a bead on that which has no name, place, or verifiable existence. To number it is not only to name it, but to tame it, and know it – and, ultimately, to dispense with it – to be done with it – in short, to ‘no’ it. It is no accident that radical behaviourism should grip the psychological field in the US with its emphasis on prediction and *control*. That there should be a psychical corollary of the geographical ‘eminent domain’ in America’s ‘manifest destiny’ is not surprising. No terrain is too great to conquer. Saying ‘It just cannot be done’ is like throwing an aphrodisiac into the gullet of a sex fiend.

The mark of a good theory is noted by many factors: its empirical elements; its rational appeal; its pragmatism – and, interestingly enough, its aesthetic qualities [Viney and King, 2003]. The elegance and beauty of psychoanalytical theories and their valiant effort to conjecture about and *word* the nuances of the intra-psychic life of the subject – especially the murmurings of the unconscious – are nothing short of awe-inspiring. The seeming impossibility of the task seems only to have, across time, inspired psychoanalysis to undergo nothing short of periodic revolutions, resulting in a profusion of psychoanalytical perspectives, including but not limited to: the neuro-psychoanalytical position that takes up the Freudian ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ armed with the recent advances in the cognitive/neuro-sciences, neuro-imaging, and the so-called psychopharmacological revolution; psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic endeavour; applied

psychoanalysis; gender studies; developmental psychoanalysis, with its long and important legacy; along with the entire panoply of theoretical and associated clinical perspectives – the familiar ‘camps’ that populate the psychoanalytical landscape – Freudian, neo-Freudian, Kleinian, neo-Kleinian, Bionian, Winnicottian, Object-Relational, and so on and so forth. However, does the clamour of our elegant pantheon of theories with their accumulated wisdom make an impact if there is nobody listening?

In the spirit of Wundt, Titchener, and Helmholtz, American psychology has disparaged that which cannot be measured. The sound of psychoanalysis in the academy is one-hand-clapping because psychoanalysis is generally absent. So colonized by an experimentalist ethos, the academy in America has managed to take some of the best movements born abroad and eviscerate them of their more subversive, revolutionary, illuminating, and compelling elements. In the case of psychoanalysis, its embrace by departments of psychiatry proved disastrous as it became aligned with a medicalized discourse and an elite for whom adjustment and adaptation to societal dictates was the *sine qua non*. The seeds of its marginalization were sown at the very stroke that it reached its zenith of popularity in the US, and much of its more readily accessible [and often pejorative] terminology co-opted into the fabric of the everyday. Non-physicians who could have been called upon to truly house and fund broader and deeper psychoanalytically-oriented academic and clinical cultures and pedagogies were deemed unsuitable for framing. The academy was left to the quantitative experimentalists who continued to devotedly measure micro- and epiphenomena and confabulate from the part to the whole that something of significance lay in their SPSS, ANOVA, MANOVA, canonical correlation spreadsheets; or brain scans, genetic and twin studies; and randomized control trial [RCT] responses to various chemical compounds [and ‘psychotherapeutic’ interventions under investigation]. Small wonder that such mutual antipathy has arisen amongst psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians and scholars, and the rest of the academic and clinical fields –

or why so many psychoanalysts hold the idea of ‘research’ in such low regard. Yet, we discard and disregard ‘empirical’ and quantitative research at our cherished profession’s peril.

Indeed, we would do well to recall that the term ‘empirical’ actually has a meaning rather different from the generally accepted modern connotation. Historically, the term references an epistemic system as derived from experience, learning, and direct observation. Historically, this has depicted the mind as a *tabula rasa*. It has traditionally been counter-posed with a rationalist view, emphasizing *a priori* knowledge, the existence of innate organising principles, and the concept of an active mind [Viney and King, 2003]. In this sense, the assaults on psychoanalysis are specious and posed through fallacious reasoning. Psychoanalysis is most certainly anchored within an empirical tradition; yet, it also embodies rationalistic elements as well. The knowledge produced by psychoanalysis is as difficult to pin down as it is to claim any one school as *the* psychoanalysis. For example, simply viewing Freud from a philosophical perspective, Chung (2003) notes that he is ‘now considered to have taken an approach characterised metaphysically by materialism, neurologically by reductionism (for example Bernfeld, 1944; Jones, 1953; Amacher, 1965; Solomon, 1974), methodologically by interactionism-dualism (for example, Kanzer, 1973; Silverstein, 1989; Silverstein and Silverstein, 1990), and characterised by parallelism (for example Jones, 1953; Marx, 1967), a token-identity approach or a dual-aspect monism (Flanagan, 1986). [NOTE: dual-aspect monism, refers to a mind-body position which emphasizes the applicability of two languages to describe the same phenomena – for example, the language of physiology versus the language that employs mentalistic concepts. This position assumes that both refer to the same underlying reality, and is one manner in which the mind-body split may be bridged (Viney and King, 2003, p 422). Such is the status of philosophical musings about this wonderfully complex concatenation of ways of knowing and knowledges we term ‘psychoanalysis’.

Yet, as Division 12 [Clinical Psychology] of the American Psychological Association has claimed a particular, political rendering and appropriation of the term ‘empirical’, as a method of *scientific* enquiry and *the* way of knowing (not simply *a* way of knowing, amongst many others), psychoanalytical communities (and humanistic-existential communities as well) have been put on the defensive. I have routinely indicated to students – as well as in my responses to surveys on the matter which an academic and an administrator is normally subjected – that an immersion in psychoanalytical theory and practice is an immersion in an empirically-supported treatment approach. Psychoanalysis sponsors a way of knowing that is different from that promulgated by the bedfellows of logical-positivism – and the so-called ‘evidence’ that is privileged in an academic, cognitive-behavioural discourse. That this has not captured the favor of third-party payor systems within the medicalized, corporatized industrial-health-care matrix is not at all surprising.

The corollary of the fate of an experiencing subject within a psychiatry captured by a biological franchise is a logical extension of the same epistemological, ontological struggle for conceptual, economic, political, and pedagogical dominance. So long as psychoanalysis cedes the field and abjures its own storied legacy within the domain of scientific enquiry, it shall be [dis]placed and lodged in the defensive position of nay-sayer; unable to determine and define the terms of the battle. The empirical findings of psychoanalysis over the past one hundred-plus years will be adjudged as inferior, and the stuff of a pseudo-science. Of course, this is yet another libel that psychoanalysis has had to bear. Popper has defined a ‘true science’ as a discourse guided by a ‘hypothetico-deductive system by which a theory can be tested and rendered falsifiable... Regardless of the number of positive instances of an observation, one is still not justified in drawing a universal conclusion’ [Viney and King, 2003, p 20].

The ‘siege mentality’ of psychoanalysis is well-known. Freud’s own positive view of the effects of his ‘splendid isolation’ on the development of psychoanalytical thought notwithstanding, it has been disastrous for the inclusion, if not acceptance of psychoanalysis – as well as psychoanalysis’ own necessary evolution and, quite possibly, survival – by virtue of its active exclusion by groups hostile to its aims, when it is not actively opting-out of the larger community of scholars and ideas that would otherwise be afforded by its being housed in universities. This has also led to the cognitive- and neuro-sciences to press-gang long-standing psychoanalytical findings into their own ‘new’, ‘break-through’ discoveries with respect to learning and memory and cognitions – of course, these are couched in the terminology of the kidnapper, and the abducted child is offered to the public as belonging to the stranger – for example, ‘unconscious process’ or ‘repression’ is now rendered as ‘implicit cognition’ or ‘implicit memory’. Clinically, students are generally in disbelief that short-term psychotherapies and what we would term ‘crisis intervention’ were originated by the earliest psychoanalysts, including Freud – or that some of the most compelling outcome literature on short-term psychotherapy comes from within the psychoanalytical movement.

This brings us to the fact that....

**Freud has *not* Left the Stadium: The Search for the Enemy and the View Within
[Psychoanalysis]**

*I am not waiting for someone
to pronounce the word which
will open the door for me. The
key is in me and I am lost.*

- Tristan Tzara

As with Elvis, there continue to be many citations [pun intended] of Freud, sixty-eight years after his death. Chung [2003] and others suggest that psychoanalysis has advanced to such a degree

that Freud now be regarded as a colleague, rather than a Father. They argue that, as psychoanalysis is so paradigmatically diverse itself, Freud stands as but one systematizer amongst many. To be sure, our profession is hardly monolithic. While it may always be alluring to kill off the parent, I would hasten to add that it was for Freud to not only point the way, and posit some hypothesized answers to the matter of the mind-body-behaviour-affect axes, but to conceive and raise the very questions themselves. Such is the position of the true pioneer and genius. Still, admittedly, Psychoanalysis is today a diverse array of inter-disciplinary perspectives and theories such that one is more precise to speak of 'The Psychoanalytical Movement'.

Yet, by what criteria can we claim to know the Truth?; and, what constitutes psychoanalytical knowledge? My idea or Yours? Theirs? Ours? In regard to the manner in which knowledge is constructed and sanctified, the history of psychoanalysis is replete with instances in which appeals to authority appear to be the principle basis for legitimacy. Indeed, studies of citations [speaking of which] have shown that far from being 'Renaissance persons', owing to enormous pressures for greater degrees of specialisation which are extant, and far earlier [unlike our intellectual forebears who often were physician-philosopher-artist-musician-theologians], there is a rank scomatization when it comes to being cognizant, let alone fluent, with the ideas and constructs outside of one's own psychoanalytical tribe. That is, in the main, Kleinians read and quote from Kleinians; Lacanians read quote Lacanians, and so forth. This tends, like other forms of in-breeding, to lead to unfortunate results, as recessive trends begin to surface in the incestuous claustrum which obtains.

Indeed, the relation of psychoanalysis to itself and to authority is a very rich, conflictual, and over-determined one. It is note-worthy that psychoanalysis, trapped at times in its own sophist, doctrinaire, and obscurantist attempts at escaping the earthly bonds of gravity that exert an influence upon its edifice like any other man-made construction that must give 'way to further iterations,

never-the-less contains the germs of its own de-construction in the form of contradictions embedded within its theories – which again, just so happens to be the hallmark of a sound, testable theory. In practice, we all-too-often see demagoguery, arrogance, elitism, and intellectual fascism – how like the rest of the carpeted den that is academia – albeit without the rigour and protections afforded by residing within a truly ecumenical, lawful surround with dissent guaranteed by such things as tenure, academic freedom, due process, and the like. It is the fact that in psychoanalytical organisations these processes run their course, unchecked, outside of more formalised university structures or broader social systems and their associated requirements for inter-disciplinary dialogue and co-operation on shared projects that transcend individual or tribal self-interest, that permit this license to assume more stultifying and oppressive levels within psychoanalytical communities.

We see this, for instance, in the path toward succession within psychoanalytical organisations – what a Chicago colleague of mine, Christine Kieffer, has termed our ‘Laius Complex’ (2007). This paranoid orientation to one’s progeny for fear that they will kill one off and abscond with the veritable goods has led to the ridiculous infantilisation of incredibly talented, experienced middle-aged [or older!] candidates being denied access to the central vestibule of authority long after they are qualified to do so.

With respect to the vicissitudes of psychoanalytical organisations, culture, the transmission of professional knowledge, values, and skills, it is rather well-known that certain traditions, pressures, and organisational imperatives problematize succession. Many of these have been articulated in great detail in the literature, including the training analyst system; the independence and confidentiality of the training psychoanalysis from organisational dynamics and politics; the elitist elements of psychoanalytical political and philosophical doctrine; the paranoiac ‘siege mentality’ that isolates psychoanalytical organisations and thought from the market place of ideas as

well as other institutions in the culture-at-large; and a propensity for fomenting schisms in relation to the carriers of the ‘true’ psychoanalytical theory and doctrine – those deemed to be the rightful heirs of Freud; as well as those consigned to the Oort Cloud of the psychoanalytical community who are in un-analysed heretical Oedipal reaction against the Father.

In this mode, and particularly with respect to the loyal adherence to a any single institute’s requirements, psychoanalysis becomes its opposite, emphasizing adaptation, conformity, submission to authority, facilitating the development or ascension in the institutional hierarchy of “normopaths” or “normotics” (McDougall, 1978; Bollas 1987) – defining health and appropriateness for advancement at all levels in terms of the candidate’s compliance to the desires and demands of the institution and/or its proxies, such as the training psychoanalyst, even if this means the installation of a pathological ‘normalcy’ [ineluctably associated with the co-optation and the normalisation of psychoanalysis itself, in betrayal of its revolutionary promise of subverting the order of things].

Yet, we know that in times of considerable flux and change, such as being a professional-in-training, ambiguity becomes a threat to the psychological well-being of the person, *and of the group*. In this regard, is there not the risk of asserting a different fundamentalism in a context that is fraught with so many fundamentalisms – especially, it would seem, of the religious and political types [superimposed within the confines of a presumptively scientific and professional field and society]? Is there not the risk then, of further promoting division, rather than dialogue and rapprochement amongst the various streams of psychoanalytical practice and thought? What are the potential implications for the future and the development of psychoanalytical knowledge, theory, and practice – and psychoanalysis itself?

Related to this are the requisite pressures to uncritically idolise, idealise the theories and/or persons privileged by the institute’s iconic figures. Such a figure is thus the Creator or Master, and

the candidate is to submit to Him or His established representative as the “one who is supposed to know”. In effect, this is to become the passive vessel of pre-thought constructions and a received wisdom that forecloses one’s own ability to speculate, theorize, and author one’s own experiences – and, emergent identity as a psychoanalyst. Identificatory processes are supplanted by indoctrination and the self is colonized by persecutory, paranoid introjects.

However, there are a number of ways out of this apparent *cul-de-sac*. Reisner (1999) notes that “Freud’s greatest contribution was psychoanalysis itself: a way of thinking about our ways of thinking and being...its commitment to progress through questioning, and its mindfulness of what gets left out of any discourse – even its own” (p 1038). Thus, the language of Freudian psychoanalysis invites its own destruction, rather than an entrenchment in absolutes. Within the theories of the different psychoanalyses extant today are the seeds of their inevitable demise – contradictions that Freud himself took note of, and led to his constantly revisiting and revising his works. This subversive element of Freud’s psychoanalysis, which holds the most revolutionary promise for the advancement of an understanding of cognition, affect, motivation, behaviour (indeed, of psychoanalysis itself), has been termed by Casey (1990) as “auto-deconstruction” (cited in Reisner (1999)). Here the text “complicates or qualifies itself in such a way as to put into question a thesis already announced expressly in the same text” (p 243). This is not so much the Kuhnian sequence of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, but a process by which “multiple vectors of thought and language arise, disappear, and reappear transformed, progressively expanding our understanding of *how we think and the terrain of what can be thought*” (Reisner, 1999, p 1046-1047, emphasis added).

Roustang (1976) situates this deconstruction within the transference one has to theory and to the Master. Much as the clinical psychoanalyst attempts to relieve the patient’s distress by evoking, through the neutrality of the psychoanalytical setting, the transference, the student of

psychoanalysis (whatever the point this may be in their career and relationship to psychoanalysis) “must first stop being fascinated by theory and analyse the fantasies and desires that gave rise to it; one must analyse theory as the text of a dream or myth” (p 58). To do otherwise eviscerates the radical possibilities that psychoanalysis holds for articulating not only the psychodynamics of individuals, but of cultural phenomena such as war, religion, art, and science to which Freud pointed the way.

All too often, in the efforts to transmit psychoanalytic theory, thought, and practice, our organisations have failed at this. Thus, psychoanalytical thought devolves into dogma, intellectual totalitarianism, and symptom – protection and defense from the knowledge that one does not know. And, in pursuit of knowing, and the finding in the theory and/or the Master, such “knowing” (which ultimately leads to foreclosure or “no-ing”), one must, at some level, be prepared to accept one’s status as disciple – which is rather different from merely being “one who does not know” – the latter being a truthful enough and honorable position to occupy on the way to knowing, never reached, and clinically, one might add, quite necessary in bringing the analysand to the point of being an experiencing and desiring subject who desires to know and can come to speak themselves to the psychoanalyst who can receive this. Contrariwise, it is the disciple, who has foreclosed on theorizing for themselves, that may assert that they do, in fact, “know”.

Thus, by refusing to view the Master as “the one who knows”, but, who never-the-less articulates a way, a method, a process out of this seemingly insoluble dilemma that binds us to him as the Master; that is, by making use of the pre-thought “knowns” as mere starting points for one’s own process of thinking and eventual discovery, we open, rather than close a potential space and with this, the possibility of a more professionally mature mode of passing the veritable torch to successive generations of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytical administrators. As Kavanaugh (2006)

is wont to note: ‘Standards standardize; regulations regulate; and institutions institutionalize’. Here, he is referencing in a pithy idiom the problems attendant within the psychoanalytical movement: authoritarianism, power, and the stultifying sway of logical-positivistic ways of knowing. I believe this can be furthered to articulate additional difficulties which are attendant: standards pulverize, regulations mediocratize, and institutions infantilise.

While a number of solutions have been put forth across time, to mixed results, I believe that opening the psychoanalytical movement to a university model is essential – even, and preferably, working to situate psychoanalytical courses in departments or programs of psychology [and populating said programs with psychoanalysts!]; the abolition of the training analyst system; greater inter-disciplinary and innovative structures for the transmission of psychoanalytical theory and practice outside of the traditional, International Psycho-analytic Association/American Psychoanalytic Association-sanctioned models and institute format; a commitment to supporting and engaging in psychoanalytically-oriented research; and, as articulated by Reeder (2004), situating the supervisory function as more central; making power relations and associated policies and procedures more transparent [absent moving psychoanalytical training into university settings, proper, instituting a university *model* within the institute].

And what of psychoanalytical knowledge? As an under-graduate, I was told that psychoanalysis was three things: [1] A general, depth theory of psychology; [2] A research method; and [3] A psychotherapeutic treatment. It is clear that Freud made use of the clinical moment more as an investigative procedure into the workings of the Mind – especially as this elucidated the dynamic unconscious. I see this as still one of the principle ways of generating new discoveries and elaborations of psychoanalytical knowledge. As we become absorbed within the rich, metaphorical language of psychoanalysis, imbued with symbol and metonymy as well, we loose ourselves from the

moorings of objective reality, and enter into the sometimes inchoate and ineffable states of dream, illusion, and reverie. It is through the essential subjective otherness of the dream that Freud elucidated so many of his seminal findings. The analytical space invites the dissolution of objective truths and shared realities, and invites the deconstruction of the dreamer him- or herself in its wake. As such, the analysand allies as much with the self-in-participation of the *process* of a psychoanalysis, that ever becomes *more and more uniquely their own*, never to be repeated, as with the *person* of the psychoanalyst, *per se*. Each association yields itself up to the eventual clustering of a chain of signifiers, decoded through the further associations to latent meanings that each layering of derivatives yields.

Bollas (1999) and Kainer (1999) note that such self-states are the precursors for the eventual transference to come. That is, the experience of being held in the mind and psyche of another, as well as finding oneself situated within a living, evolving *clinical* process necessarily comes to be fixated upon the person of the psychoanalyst and his or her presumptively shared experience that is not merely presumed to be coterminous, but coextensive with that of the patient's. Whether the patient is able to make use of such transference states, or tends to relate more to the person of the psychoanalyst, is of lesser importance than the psychoanalyst's maintaining a position of neutrality, receptivity (evenly suspended attentiveness), and a graded silence that yields itself only to an interpretative mode.

I want to reference the perspective of Peter Fonagy regarding the '*scientific validity* of psychoanalysis' [cited in Chung, 2003, p 14, emphasis added]. Fonagy, is, of course, no stranger to empirical research, and has contributed much to the literature to support the efficacy of psychoanalytically-oriented treatments to severe psychopathology, amongst other things – much-needed in the present-day milieu:

I see no reason why psychoanalysts should care if psychoanalysis is a science. I can see how they might benefit were this to be the case, but I cannot see that any amount of playing with categories, demarcations, and boundaries of science would make it so. The questions which should concern us are about the nature of mental life, the process of cure, the efficacy of analysis as therapy. Naturally, these entail critical methodological issues concerning which procedures might be most likely to yield pertinent data...I do not think we know enough about what psychoanalysis is to make a meaningful attempt to link it to an, in any case, ill-defined and heterogeneous category of enterprises which we currently call scientific. For some of us psychoanalysis is principally a clinical matter with some generalisations concerning technique and theory. I would prefer to see it as a body of knowledge which is applied to a currently somewhat constrained set of psychotherapeutic situations.... [Fonagy, 1996, p 116].

Psychoanalysts must endeavour to reposition themselves within an inclusive community of scholars and ecumenical debate such as that afforded by universities if psychoanalysis is to survive – to be transmitted to successive generations – and, much depends upon the survival of psychoanalysis, as determined by *psychoanalysts*, and not by those who would denigrate or deprecate it, or otherwise capture it within some revisionist paradigm within the health care-industrial complex. I would argue that psychoanalytical institutes need to consider affiliating with universities.

Winnicott (1971) noted that the psychoanalytical situation provides a setting separate from, but related to, the world-at-large, and in this way, so too can the academy – along with protections such as academic freedom, grievance procedures, institutional and programmatic *Policies and Procedures*, and even accreditation bodies [potentially good for something after all]. A major challenge is to preserve the integrity of students' professional development in a similar fashion. By securing a frame, a container, faculty and administration can titrate upward the students' exposure to various pressures, diverse discourses, and external impingements as this relates to the internalisation and ultimate discharge of their professional responsibilities. By constituting itself as a "holding environment" or "potential space" within a culture that is suspicious and hostile toward psychoanalysis, the University structure that supports psychoanalytical discourses creates conditions that maximize the growth and unfolding of students' capacities. Unless this occurs, psychoanalytic

institutes will not have suitably prepared candidates – or, perhaps candidates at all – desirous of seeking additional training in this tradition with its rich legacy.

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