

Brain, Mind, Psyche: Preserving the Third Term
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I welcome the opportunity to present here a longer version of the paper (that is, extemporaneous talk) I gave at the convention in Toronto. I had as always prepared much more than I could say and then as always let the vibes of the moment take me where they would. Here is much more orderly though not final terms is the argument I was attempting to make. I think it speaks to the actual topic of the conference and also thereby to an unacknowledged crisis within psychoanalysis today. Preserving what makes psychoanalysis a distinctive way of looking at the human being (and thereby everything else) is a hard task. Most of what is going on in the discipline today has, I think, lost contact with Freud's essential insights and why, I think, he remains the primary source of all that is radical and most worth preserving in psychoanalysis. But that goal may be an impossible one because of the ideological or theoretical situation we face which may contain implicit in it what for lack of a better term I'll call the death of psychoanalysis. Thus:

Part I: The Ideological Dilemma

“Every assertion contains an assumption, which is the real thing that is being asserted.”
Frege

My subject is all that we are in the process of making it impossible for ourselves to any longer talk about or know. There is now a paradigm within Anglo-American psychoanalysis that establishes the assumptions to which almost everyone in the field is in the process of adapting their minds. The result, I hope to show, will be the death of everything radical in Freud, everything that could make psychoanalysis stand out as the most radical and disruptive understanding of human beings yet developed. We face, without knowing it, a crisis. One of the reasons we can't know it is discussed in this section.

Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* remains the classic work in what I will call the ideology of science. Kuhn there demonstrates three things about “scientific objectivity,” etc. (1) Science takes place within a paradigm—a set of assumptions—that are not questioned by the bulk of practitioners. (2) Normal scientists contra the PR are not self-critical thinkers but simple practitioners who produce the “knowledge” they do because that knowledge agrees with the paradigm. (They flesh it out hoping to extend it so far that it will explain everything.) (3) A scientific revolution comes along when some original thinker sees that the paradigm is false and needs to be replaced by a radically new way of thinking.

I would add a fourth factor to what Kuhn says, one especially noteworthy in terms of the ways in which psychoanalysis in America today is trying to reinterpret itself so that it will align itself to neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the scientific-cognitive theory of brain-mind: *science is a social reality determined by the “wishes” of its society*, which in America means adaptation to capitalism and its imperatives as the way

of being people must internalize and live in conformity to in order to achieve what the mental health practitioners will call health, normality, adjustment, and the achievement of a good, strong stable self.

The above considerations suggests that along with its conceptual credentials any concept has to be interrogated in terms of three factors: **the desire behind it; the fear thereby exorcised; and the ideology fulfilled.** We will only begin to understand thinking—philosophy, science, political theory etc.—as a psychoanalytic activity when we coordinate those three factors with particular concepts. (This essay offers one example that will only be clear at the end. Namely, that the idea of human nature and the persistent effort to think about human experience in essentialistic terms of what is natural and unchanging is a flight from existence, contingency, and the actual conflicts that define subjectivity. Modernity began when Hegel declared the need to move from substance to subject in the understanding of the human being; that is, from the idea of a fixed nature to the understanding of a fundamental unrest, conflict, anxious inwardness, self-overcoming, and freedom as defining human existence. Or as Sartre put it in continuing that effort, “existence precedes essence.” The attempt of contemporary Anglo-American psychoanalysis is to turn back the clock. To offer us again the comforts of a nature to provide all sorts of conceptual guarantees that will limit or remove the bite of contingency.

An understanding of how deeply thought in any discipline is controlled by ideology suggests, unfortunately, a lugubrious conclusion about the situation we face at this conference. The brain-mind movement in psychoanalysis has become the paradigm that most everyone will devote their careers to fleshing out both because its assumptions are now so deeply ingrained that they can't be identified let alone questioned; and because psychoanalysis knows that if it is to survive in America it has to reinterpret itself along these lines. That is, whatever can be reinterpreted to fit within this paradigm or use parts of the paradigm to strengthen itself will survive. Whatever doesn't will become unintelligible.

To which I'll add my thesis: the unintelligible stuff is precisely what we must save because it is where we will rediscover psyche as opposed to mind and brain. But saying this amounts to two claims: that I can demonstrate the basic fallacies of the paradigm and that I have a new paradigm to offer.

Essentially I'll be concerned to question the assumptions behind two developments. First, the scientific assumptions behind the neurobiological brain-mind scientific *explanations* set forth by non-psychoanalytic thinkers such as Pinker, Dennett and others and their enthusiastic endorsement by psychoanalytic thinkers such as Schore, Solms, and Eric Kandel. Kandel is as an especially revealing example since this Nobel winning neurobiologist never lost his original desire to become a psychoanalyst (and lord help his Cartesian pineal gland, continues to hope that one day we'll be able to locate precisely where the dynamic unconscious is in the brain!) Especially revealing in this regard is Kandel's naïve misunderstanding of Freud and his assertion of something that is historically false but has now assumed the status of the highest dogma: that Freud abandoned the 1895 *Project for a Scientific Psychology* because neuroscience wasn't developed far enough then. This is not why he abandoned it, but that's a long story. Second, the status given Fonagy *et als* *Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the*

Development of the Self precisely because this work does the best job thusfar in connecting the three principles required for the paradigm to proclaim its universal explanatory power. Call it:

affectiveneurobiologicalattachmentcognitivedevelopmentselfpsychology. That is, the union of the developing brain—the developing mind—and the magic potion: attachment theory. For as Fonagy argues, the kind of attachment we get results in the development of the form of our brain and therefore of our ability to “mentalize” in ways that are “healthy” or not so.

So deeply are the assumptions behind this position ingrained in most of us by now that most readers of Fonagy applaud the book precisely because it lends support to adaptation, the myth of the perfectly attached mother (Benjamin’s “bonds of love”), and the idea of *development* as the building up of *structures* that make for a coherent and stable subject who, following the imperative of normalization, functions well in the world.

The near hegemony of that position is fortunate because it enables me to foreground *the antithesis that permits no synthesis*. (And thus no easy eclecticism, which is one of the greatest perils today to serious thought; namely, the tendency to want to make a place for everything in one’s “position” under the idea that all “insights” are part of the grand general “mix.”) The moment I start to relate to my being in terms of conflicts that create an anxiety that must be sustained and deepened despite all the defenses and adaptations they threaten a new ballgame has begun; one in which psyche as opposed to behavior determines possibilities that operate by a logic radically different from the logic and assumptions that underlie the paradigm. But to make that evident the prior task I face is to articulate those assumptions. We can’t see them because we are already caught up in applying them. But that means we really can’t understand our own ideas. Nor how dubious they are. Creating those possibilities will be the function of the next section.

The ideological function of a paradigm is that it renders something one doesn’t want to know about unintelligible. As psychoanalysts that should peak our curiosity, since our supposed goal is always to open ourselves to the repressed and then remake ourselves by what we thereby learn.

II. Basic Assumptions of the Paradigm

“A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”

Wittgenstein, **Philosophic Investigations**

This section attempts what is probably impossible: to demystify the halo and aura surrounding “science” when it comes to psychology. A long shadow here creeps across the page; Heinz Hartman and the effort that has defined the history of psychoanalysis in America; namely, not just to preach adaptation but to adapt all psychoanalytic concepts to the scientific paradigm of academic psychology. In terms of the overarching opposition

I wish to establish, what psychoanalysis must do to become a science thus represses what it must do to preserve itself as a tragic art.

The scientific paradigm rests on a number of methodological and ontological assumptions. Stating the main ones will reveal two problems: how much of our thinking now operates within these assumptions as if they were beyond question and, of greater importance, all that these assumptions make it impossible for us to think and perceive. The following list is not complete nor is it in a necessary order of importance.

(1) The principle of reductionism. Developed states of phenomena must be traced back to the conditions of their origin. Moreover, the laws that maintain at the origin must explain all subsequent developments. What is an explanation? Well an explanation doesn't exist, Dennett, Pinker and others argue what was once understood in some vague and incorrect way is now understood in terms of the laws of the origin. (And thus the innocuous things that Darwinian thinkers are now forced to say about art, religion, love etc.) Contrast: the principle of emergence: new ways of being arise out of experience that cannot be traced back to the origin. Scientism rests on what Mediaeval philosophers called the genetic fallacy; i.e., the attempt to account for the developed state of a phenomenon by specifying the conditions of its origin.

(2) Evolutionary biology must explain everything about life, consciousness, and culture. If we haven't yet found the neurobiological determinations of a phenomenon that means it has not yet been understood. Contrast: This is a perfect example of circular thinking; of assuming what one wants to prove and of dogmatically forbidding the consideration of any other explanations. The best contemporary model of this: Stephen Pinker.

(3) Complex phenomena that appear to exceed the naturalistic, materialistic standpoint must be explained in terms of it. Contrast: When one says x conscious act correlates to y neural pathway in the brain what has one said. That the latter is *no more than*. But that is tautological. The no more than ideology or fallacy is the ruling principle of the kind of explanations that the paradigm demands for all psychological phenomena.

(4) Adaptation rules. Those who violate it are violating evolution. That must be because something is wrong with their brains or their early experiences. Contrast: The hidden ideology of the paradigm is conformity with capitalist society and the desire to label all other behaviors deviant, sick etc. A science of rocks can be value-free, neutral perhaps, but a science of the psyche is always tied to social, political, cultural imperatives

(5) The desire behind the basic belief that the human being is a thing among things operating by the same principles that determine the behavior of all living things is the desire for an origin that assures the adaptational solidity, safety and security of an "ego" or identity that delivers us from the anxiety of existence by resolving us of responsibility for ourselves. That's the charm of determinism: I could be no other way than the way I am. Attain a scientific perspective on one's life and one sees that freedom is a myth. Contrast: The argument Sartre made that it is impossible for a living being to see himself or herself as a thing among things except as an attempt to flee responsibility for one's freedom.

(6) To be is to exist as nature does. All else is epiphenomenal. Or a disposable byproduct of the evolutionary process. Consciousness is the way it is because that's how the mind works. The ultimate principles of matter and survival determine all subsequent

operations. Contrast: Reflection is an emergent act that can't be reduced; culture, art, thought are not natural processes obeying natural laws.

(7) Psychology is about adapting, functioning, developing corrective experiences because self-regulation is the principle that determines the health of human organisms. Attachment as the primary need is thus hard-wired in us biologically. And thus the grandest ideological assertion of all: we finally have the cause that will explain human nature. Contrast: There is no such thing as human nature. That substantialistic or essentialistic way of thinking was refuted by Hegel. The human subject *exists*: relating to oneself in terms of assuming in anxiety the burden of one's existence makes everyone *sui generis*.

(8) The logic of entailment: How the brain works is simply an example of how evolutionary neurobiology works; how the mind works is an example of how the brain works; how the psyche works is an example of how the mind works. Brain: energy of flow of neurons. Mind: flow of information. Contrast: see part 3.

(9) Normativity. There must be a norm in the study of psychology. It must be established on the basis of what most people do. What defines that basic conformity must be valorized. That's the hidden purpose of psychology. To find a way to say that the way ordinary people are, behave is what human nature must be and that all anomalous or non-adaptive ways of being are unhealthy. Contrast: The normal, ordinary, well adapted human being is a creature of massive defenses defined by a massive flight from anxiety, reality, and, above all, human possibility.

(10) Self-regulation to adapt is THE definition of all dynamic living systems. Contrast: Or, as #9 suggests, the distinctively human act is the refusal to adapt.

(11) The fixation on origin. And the insistence on accounting for all emergent activities reductively. (Or as byproducts: what religion and art, for example, become in the paradigm.) Accordingly, the main metaphysical question that haunts the paradigm is "how did consciousness ever arise?" or, as some restate it, "how demonstrate that there really is no such thing as consciousness?" Contrast: Self-consciousness qua reflection in its posing and sustain the question "what does it mean to exist and what must I do given to live out the anxiety of that question?" establishes, metaphysically, a first principle (or origin) that cannot be reduced to or explained within the paradigm.

(12) A circularity blind to itself with respect to the nature of consciousness. The only descriptions of consciousness that can be allowed are those which correspond to the origin. Dennett the contemporary model of this strategy. Contrast: The continuing relevance of William James who started with the scientific paradigm in his great book on psychology and then came to realize that it did not account for consciousness and the activities that define it. But then his method was one the paradigm refuses. Namely, the *description* of lived experiences as they are lived and all one can know, accordingly, if one isn't ruled by a theory or paradigm that refuses such descriptions or insists on seeing them as something that must be reduced to something more basic. (I'll return to this contrast later.)

This overview is far from complete, but should give all readers some insight into the fact that the paradigm rests on a number of metaphysical and methodological ideas that are questionable to say the least. Moreover, my goal here has been to offer the reader some experience of how the assumptions operate which is now complicated by a contrast. Or, to put it in ontological terms, we need to recover *Dialectics* as a way of

thinking by restoring its basic principles to the center of our thought. Those principles: emergence, existence as at issue, self-reference as self-overcoming, drama or agonistics as the being of the subject, and to state the contrast, the survival value of suffering and the need to add the sufferance principle to the reality and pleasure principles when one's subject is the human psyche. But before I can say more on that I need to provide a final summary of the position that the assumptions behind the paradigm produces, the position that must be rejected if we are to sustain the psychoanalytic revolution.

Thus, the combined work of figures as diverse as Schore, Fonagy, Kandel, Siegel, Solms results in the following formulation of what I'll term the basic theory of psyche in contemporary American psychoanalysis. (Or, the position we have to overcome in order to regain our subject.) : *The synthesis of current knowledge about the brain (affective neuroscience), the mind (cognitive psychology) and the primacy of attachment (attachment theory) provides us with a theory of **adaptation and affect regulation** that offers the one viable theory of psyche: as **development** through the building up of **structures** that guarantee the coming into being of the normal, healthy, well-adjusted person who has achieved a coherent and stable **self** and who therefore functions well in the world.*

The fact that most American and British psychoanalysts today would hail this formulation as the cat's pyjamas is a sign of how bad off we are; how much the discipline has lost contact with its origin. For as I'll show in the next section, insofar as one thinks along the lines outlined in the formulation one has lost touch with *the subject of psychoanalysis*.

III. The Subject of Psychoanalysis

"One can find in my work the basis for a very grave philosophy"

Freud

I thus come to my main theoretical argument. Namely, that psyche is distinct from brain and mind. (I'll present the main theoretical argument (which I've presented at length elsewhere in print) briefly here so that, for purposes of making this presentation as concrete as possible, I can develop it through an extended single example.

The following formulation defines psyche in terms of its origin: *the transmission of the conflicts of the parent's unconscious as the **wound** that issues in a psychotic anxiety that threatens one's ability to go on being.* To put it in terms of a contrast: attachment theory is an attempt to deny psyche: to argue that parent's somehow magically bracket their unconscious conflicts in their relationship to the child and therefore children receive "bonds of love" that issue in a stable self. The actual process of "development" is thereby repressed. For the development of psyche, in contrast to the development of the adaptational ego (i.e., ego as the defense structure vigorously opposed to psychological reality), is the **agonistic relationship** that one lives to the psychosexual conflicts that the wound creates. (As we'll see below, the wound is a sexual experience and a recovery of what has been lost in American psychoanalysis: Freud's insight into sexuality as the key to the psyche.) Psyche as subject (not self or identity, those myths created to repress experience) is that **self-reference** that sustains the

burden of the conflicts of one's origins in agons or dramas that sustain anxiety as the basis of existential self-mediation. Drama defines the being of the subject: we are what we are as a result of the relationship we live to the core conflicts bequeathed us by our parental origins. Which leads to Freud's deepest discovery: psyche and experience are a *tragic process*. In fleeing ourselves we bring about the thing we most fear. That, the wisdom of Sophocles and Shakespeare, is also the thing Freud discovered repeatedly in his analysands. There is, indeed, a development and a structure to experience. It is defined by the following: (1) the movement to a catastrophe in which by bringing about the thing one fears (and in it the recognition of the bankruptcy of one's life) one has finally put oneself in a position to know the truth about one's life and its underlying structure; and (2) change as the process of living out a new relationship to one's core conflicts, not by running from the tragic but by immersing oneself in it. I must add what should go unsaid for a psychoanalytic audience. The tragic isn't a woeful pessimistic thing one should flee at whatever cost (the programmed attitude of most people toward it), it is the best thing that could happen because it is what first puts one in a position where none of the lies and defenses are any longer possible. But lest the adaptational, attachment crowd sneak in their notion that the tragic will lead to their way of being, it is necessary to indicate that the logic of tragic development never results in a coherent, stable self that regulates its emotions in order to preserve its happy talk adaptation to social normality. Psyche as *agonistic, existentializing self-reference* never issues in such; and if, for example, through tragic experience one "attaches" to others in a new way (Lear reunited with Cordelia for example), that way has nothing in common with the values and ways of attachment theory. (The greatest danger to any thought is that the opponent is always waiting at the end to claim you've gotten to where they already are. When all they illustrate by that is that they've refused the journey; or, in other words, are incapable of thinking outside their framework.)

I now want to illustrate this through a contrast with Fonagy in an attempt to offer or force the reader to make a choice.

(1) Fonagy: The mother attaches in a way that helps regulate negative experiences so that the child develops basic trust, etc. Davis: The transmission of the parent's unconscious conflicts is the process through which the psyche is born—as wound.

(2) Fonagy: The stable. Coherent autobiographical self capable of giving a coherent narrative of its life is the true self and the great achievement of normal, healthy development. Davis: Normal narratives are lies we tell to escape the truth of the narrative we are afraid to tell; about the anguish of conflicts that show there can never be a self, only flaming suffering, the living out of conflicts one can't escape because they are one's very being.

(3) Fonagy: Positive emotion is self-regulation through the control or management of distressing experiences so that one can retain a calm, happy self. Davis: Tragic primary emotions (anguish, dread, compassion) sustained as melancholic suffering creates inwardness; i.e., psyche as ongoing existential self-mediation. Primary emotions are defined by the absence of all inner distance between who one is and what one feels; they cannot be discharged or managed within the principles that regulate the ego; they shatter it in order to put us at issue to ourselves.

(4) Fonagy: Emotional health is the development of the right positive emotions in their ability to regulate and control negative ones. Davis: Emotional growth is the

sustaining of primary emotions and the suffering that defines them as portals of discovery; to know is to suffer without insisting that one's suffering must be ruled by closure, "catharsis", and discharge.

In terms of my overarching effort to show that psyche is a third term that is different from and should not be reduced to brain or mind I can now offer the following argument. First, by way of getting beyond an unavoidable terminological problem. Of course, anything we do as conscious agents is a function of the fact that we have a mind; or, to be more precise, is an act of mind. That obvious point, however, conceals the problem, which is essentially that the term mind, as understood by cognitive psychology, has been used to eliminate the very things that I call attention to under the term psyche. You see there's a cute little ideological trick that is played on us here. We accept a severely restricted determination of what mind is (as defined by cognitive psychology) and therefore find it impossible to talk about activities that we could if we didn't have such a reductive theory of mind. The issue can now be posed thus: what concept of mind will we have to develop once we start acknowledging the kind of activities that agonistically engaged psyches do? If psyche operates by principles radically different from those that characterize mind as mind is conceived in cognitive psychology then we have to reject that theory of mind and develop a much more complex one. One that is far more right-brained or far more open to artistic creativity, dream, and neurosis as basic models of how the mind operates. (I.e., a return to Freud.) Or to put it in another way, the argument that unresolved trauma is a lack of neural integration in the adult brain—i.e., that tragic existence violates the brains "stress regulation system"—needs to be seen as a choice and not a scientific truth. The happy compliant child is richly rewarded with the fruits of his or her obeisance, but the cost may be never having really lived. Or, in terms of sustaining the contrast that must be sustained even if it involves a terminological paradox : *what the mind can't think, the psyche can suffer*. (That is, we need a theory of mind based on the primacy of activities other than adaptational cognition.)

If I had world enough and time I'd like to develop a final contrast in terms of the theory of sexuality within relational psychology that Fonagy recently presented as a Presidential Address to the APA. It is a singularly revealing document, of all that's been lost in the movement from Freud to the paradigm. For now all I can do is suggest a basic contrast. Freud's great discover is that the conflicts of psychosexual identity define us. There is no psyche separate from one's sexuality that can manage or adapt it as it supposedly does everything else. Sexuality is radically disruptive—and in that disruptiveness reveals that that is what we are: beings utterly at issue to ourselves in the radical power of desire to shatter all the adjustments and adaptations we attempt to make in order to flee our being. Ahh, that's the rub. Such a psychoanalysis is not something that can be tested scientifically because its key concepts and experiences are ones that can never be formulated in a way that will make sense to the scientific understanding. Insofar as we try to make our subject scientifically viable we destroy or lose contact with it. That puts us in an untenable situation with respect to the paradigm, doesn't it? Indeed it does. That's my point. A choice must be made here.

I find in retrospect that I must add a few words here. I put them in italics to indicate they are a supplement to the essay; even though I said quite a bit on this as the presentation. I want to add this because I think Fonagy's address reveals the bankruptcy of all the forces in psychoanalysis that his theorizing represents;

and, moreover, reveals that sexuality is where those defects become evident because sexuality remains the reality that grounds the very possibility and nature of radical psychoanalysis. (Again I've written on this at length elsewhere.) The key to the error that Fonagy's essay makes evident first occurs in this singularly revealing statement. "Sexual feelings are unique by being systematically ignored and left un-mirrored by caregivers." If you ever wanted all the contradictions of a position in a single statement you couldn't ask for more. Let me translate. Mirroring for affect regulation is the old wine of ego psychology in a new bottle; the cardinal assumption, that experience is all about mirroring wholly positive relationships so that we can "feel happy." Anything that threatens that view of self, identity, ego etc. isn't mirrored. Well, it is mirrored but in a fractured Picassoed mirror which creates the wound that the psyche is. Let me give the simplest of experiences. My mother had a nice little dog named Ricky who was very hygienic and so frequent licked his privates. Every time he did she stopped him, often with punishment. And even after I explained that he wasn't doing what every male convict wishes he could, my mother couldn't stop. His action activated a traumatic register of her psyche that she had to act by mirroring her displeasure. Yes, that's my point: in her relationship to the dog I was given another image of what her relationship had been to me as a sexual being. Now Fonagy plays all sorts of terminological games to claim that he can incorporate such experiences by saying they aren't mirrored, remain traumatic, indicate that sex is essentially psychotic, etc. That's his left-handed way of making my point. Namely, that this is what the psyche (as opposed to all the nice mirrored defences and happy feelings of the "self") is; and that psyche is precisely what contemporary anglo-american psychoanalysis has lost contact with. To restore that contact we have to rethink sexuality. The first step toward that is to see that Fonagy's statement that sex is one of the things, experiences that the self has to regulate puts the cart before the horse so that both will get stuck in the mud. Sexuality isn't something the ego/self manages. It is the very origin and center of psyche as something that is prior to and utterly disruptive of all the ways in which the ego tries to convince itself that it is healthy, stable, coherent, etc. Once one starts to know that Fonagy's essay becomes one of the most comic performances on record. Consider the following sentence: "Incongruent mirroring disrupts self-coherence generating a sense of incongruence in relation to the psychosexual." This is Fonagy's hilarious indirect way of getting to what should and must be our starting point. The essay abounds in that irony. Like so many things it shows how those who try to flee or defend against the sexual create theories that only serve to reveal what they try to conceal. Let me put it another way, since I can't here give a full explanation of what Freud was getting at in his cardinal insight: that sexuality and psyche (or conflicted self-division as "identity") are inseparable and that the former is and remains the key to all that gets "developed" in the latter. But consider this salutary statement by Andre Green: "What is at stake is the following: it is a question of knowing whether or not the sexual is the concept [reality] which causes psychical activity to develop—to become organized, differentiated and particularized—whether, that is, it establishes the relations between consciousness and unconscious activity."

Thanks to Fonagy's essay the answer to that question must be yes. But in that yes we find both how lost contemporary psychoanalysis is and what we must do to recover the real thing. Namely, re-immense ourselves in sexuality via what I'll offer here as a preliminary definition. (I don't want to say more now because I want my readers to simply reflect on Green's statement in terms of its radical implications.) Sexuality is that experience in which the eroticized body is the core conflicts of the psyche as those conflicts are necessarily lived, engaged, agonized, suffered whenever the psyche opens itself through touch to feelings that shatter all the masks of the ego/self and restore our immediate contact with our abiding traumas. That is, the body as pleasure-anxiety in conflict as such revealing/living all you don't want to know about yourself that you are. Thus, to cite the simplest examples: premature ejaculation, impotence, frigidity as acts of the psyche whenever it again experiences itself as body as wound created by the other. (The point is Spinozistic: sex as body and psyche as subjectivity (not ego or ratiocination) are the two ways in which the same reality (as extension and as thought) are manifest. Or, to conclude briefly: sex is the radically disruptive reality that shatters the conceptual schemes that have been developed in order to try to contain and flee it.

IV. Concluding Unscientific Postscript

*The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is **capable** of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. Heidegger, **Being and Time***

*"If to be means to exist the way nature does, then everything which is given as refractory to the categories and to the mode of existence of nature will, as such, have no objectivity and will be, a priori and unavoidably, reduced to something natural. The characteristics of such objects will be reduced to purely subjective phenomena which, with their multifarious structure, are the products of natural causality." Levinas, **The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology***

Eclecticism is inviting both professionally and as a way of avoiding difficult theoretical issues. But we face a choice. For it is impossible to preserve what is distinctive about psychoanalysis once we try to recast our thought in the terms and logic required by the paradigm. If that means that psychoanalysis is not the method of treatment for most of the problems identified by general psychology so be it. We will have lost some money but we'll have preserved something of greater value. Namely, the radically disruptive ability of psychoanalysis to expose us to ourselves and to challenge the psychological motives behind the ways we think. To remake our discipline in terms of the paradigm, as just about everyone today is rushing to do, is to lose sight of our subject. In effect, psychoanalysis dies without knowing it is doing so. Rather than watering down psychoanalysis so that it can find a place within the paradigm, we must restrict it by emphasizing all the ways in which it is distinctive—and even unintelligible to the paradigm. You can begin by resisting the easy desire to say "well, Mr. Davis has

gone too far. I prefer to take a little bit of this and a little bit of that and see that it's all part of the mix. After all, as Rodney King said, 'can't we just get along.'" Or as Dimitri Karamozov said in rejecting that offer. "...it's all there in the nerves, in the head, there are these nerves in the brain...there are little sorts of tails, these nerves have little tails, well, and when they start trembling there..that is, you see, I look at something with my eyes, like this, and they start trembling, these little tails..and when they tremble, an image appears, not at once, but in a moment, it takes a second, and then a certain moment appears, as it were, that is, not a moment—devil take the moment—but an image, that is, an object or an event, well, devil take it—and that's why I contemplate, and then think ...because of the little tails, and not at all because I have a soul or am some sort of image and likeness, that's all foolishness." (Dostoyevsky, **The Brothers Karamazov**)

The desire to avoid theoretical issues, let alone a conceptual crisis, is understandable given the fact that eclecticism is so serviceable to survival. And after all who would doubt that neuropsychopharmacological explanations and treatments are the ones that work best with certain schizophrenias? They do. That's my point. When they do let them do so without assuming that means you must extend the assumptions implicit in the theoretical formulation of that *why* to the psyche in general. Or see it as a *perspective* one must incorporate. For the question is—a perspective on what? It is time to rid ourselves of the shadow of Heinz Hartman. Psychoanalysis is not a general psychology nor should it try to be. When it does it will always end up losing all of its distinctive insights to the assumptions that control the scientific paradigm. Our task I want to argue in closing is not to continue making our subject so vague that we'll fit in with everything else in psychology but to restrict our understanding to something austere and specialized. Psychoanalysis is not a science it is an art. Moreover, it is an art that applies only to a very small range of phenomena. Those phenomena (or acts of human violation, refusal, courage and despair) that cannot be explained in an even remotely adequate way by the paradigm. Those subjects who need psychoanalysis because without knowing it at first they want their being to be regulated by a tragic discipline. Psyche is this terrifying struggle of the human being with the overpowering conflicts of its deepest desires, experiences, feelings. When such is the case one needs psychoanalysis. The other stuff: we should gladly give it to the other psychological disciplines. Otherwise we'll lose the reality most worth preserving. And the saddest thing, we'll have lost it without ever experiencing the tragic glory of it.

*I want to add here one other concluding word that was in my presentation. I there concluded with this story as an example of one thing that is afoot in the current effort to create a rapprochement between psychoanalysis and neurophysiology. About five years ago one of my best friends—and my sensei in karate—went to work one day and shot to death a woman co-worker (and former lover) and then shot himself. (I alone perhaps knew all that entered into this act in terms of my friend's sexual abuse by his stepfather and his desertion by his mother when he told her about it.) But at karate that night a member of our dojo who is also a distinguished professor in the physiology department told us that we didn't know the serotonin level in sensei's blood at the time of the catastrophe and therefore could say and know nothing about what **caused** the event. I won't repeat here what I said about when cowardice and flight from the psyche become a reductive metaphysics that has its charm in all that it protects us from ever having to*

feel. But those who wish can go back to what I said about the motives that an ideology serves and perhaps find in this example a paradigm of the deeper factors that control what prides itself on being science.